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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-1895 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BARRY LITTLE, 
Appellant                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-07-cr-00207-003) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 29, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendant Barry Little appeals his conviction and sentence for interfering with 
interstate commerce by robbery and conspiring to interfere with interstate commerce by 
robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  His counsel has moved to 
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Because we agree with 
2 
 
counsel that there are no non-frivolous arguments in support of Little‟s appeal, we will 
affirm.
1
     
 On the afternoon of July 4, 2006, Little and two co-conspirators robbed a Radio 
Shack store at gun point, and made off with electronic merchandise valued at more than 
$13,000.  After a jury trial, Little was found guilty on two counts of violating the Hobbs 
Act.  The District Court sentenced him to 180 months‟ imprisonment, based on a 
Guideline sentencing range of 151 to 188 months‟ imprisonment.2 
 Under Anders, if court-appointed “counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request 
permission to withdraw.”  Id. at 744.  That request must be accompanied by an adequate 
brief discussing “anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  Id.  A 
brief is adequate when counsel has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable 
issues, and has explained why those issues are frivolous.  United States v. Marvin, 211 
F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000).  After we determine whether counsel has met his 
requirements under Anders, we independently examine the record for any non-frivolous 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
2
 Under the Guidelines, Little‟s sentence was calculated as follows:  the District Court 
started with a base offense level of 20 based on § 2B3.1, the applicable guideline for a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.  Pursuant to §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) and 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(I), the 
District Court assessed a six-level increase for the use of a firearm.  Next, the District 
Court added two levels pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) for bodily injury.  The District 
Court also assessed a one-level increase pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B) for a loss in excess 
of $10,000.  Finally, the District Court assessed a two-level increase pursuant to § 3C1.1 
for obstruction of justice.  Thus, the total offense level was 31.  Little has a criminal 
history that placed him within Category IV.  Accordingly, the advisory sentencing range 
was 151-188 months.  (PSR ¶ 35). 
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issues.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where counsel‟s brief 
is adequate, we will confine our inquiry to issues raised by counsel in his Anders brief 
and by the defendant in his pro se brief.  Id. at 301.  Little has not filed a pro se brief. 
 Counsel identifies the following potentially non-frivolous issues in his brief:  1) 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial; 2) the six-level increase in the offense level for use of 
a firearm; 3) the two-level increase in the offense level for bodily injury; 4) the two-level 
increase in the offense level for obstruction of justice; and 5) the procedural and 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  We address each in turn. 
 In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government.  United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1997).  
The court should sustain the verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citation omitted).   
 Counsel asserts that the evidence presented at trial sufficiently proved the essential 
elements of the Hobbs Act violation.  The only defense Little raised was that he was not 
the third participant in the robbery.  Counsel summarizes the evidence which establishes 
Little‟s participation in the robbery.  Little‟s co-conspirators testified that he was the third 
accomplice in the robbery.  Furthermore, cell phone records placed Little‟s cell phone at 
the scene of the robbery.  Finally, tests performed on the DNA evidence found at the 
scene of the crime revealed that 99.98% of the African American population could be 
excluded as a source of this DNA, and Little was not among that 99.98%.  In light of the 
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evidence presented, counsel asserts that it would be frivolous to argue that no rational 
trier of fact could have found Little guilty.  We agree. 
 We turn next to Little‟s objection at sentencing to the six-level increase in the 
offense level for use of a firearm.
3
  Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) of the Guidelines provides for 
a six-level increase in the event a firearm is “otherwise used.”  The evidence at trial 
demonstrated that, during the robbery, a firearm was “otherwise used.”  See U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.1, cmt. n. 1(I) (defining “otherwise used” as “conduct [that] did not amount to the 
discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a 
firearm.”).  Little‟s co-conspirators pointed a gun at the store employees, attempted to 
chamber a cartridge, subsequently did chamber a cartridge, and ordered the store 
employees to lie on the floor.  See United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 
1999) (explaining that when a “firearm is leveled at the head of a victim, and especially 
when this act is accompanied by explicit verbal threats, we have had no difficulty 
determining that the firearm was „otherwise used.‟”) (citation omitted).  Little, moreover, 
is responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) & (B) 
(providing that defendant is responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity”).  This 
evidence, counsel argues, demonstrates that there is no basis to appeal the application of 
the six-level increase pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B).  We agree.   
                                                 
3
 At sentencing, Little also objected to a one-level increase pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B) 
for a loss in excess of $10,000, and the criminal history point calculation that placed him 
in Category IV.  Counsel explains that these objections were the result of newly-
appointed counsel‟s unfamiliarity with the evidence presented at trial and the criteria for 
calculating criminal history points, and, as such, were frivolous on their face.  We agree. 
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 Little then objected to a two-level increase in the offense level for bodily injury 
pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) of the Guidelines.  At the sentencing hearing, the 
government supplied a color photograph showing the abrasion that was sustained by a 
customer who fell when Little grabbed him as the customer tried to flee the store.  The 
court found that the photograph depicted a “significant injury . . . to the elbow and upper 
arm, and . . . discoloration of the lower arm.”  App. 194.  We agree that this evidence 
supports application of the enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A). 
 Additionally, Little objected to the two-level increase in the offense level for 
obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the Guidelines.  Little wrote a letter to the 
mother of one of his co-conspirator‟s children, in which he implicitly threatened the co-
conspirator with harm, warning that “snitches die slow.”  We agree that this conduct 
supports application of the § 3C1.1 enhancement.  See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(A) 
(explaining that indirectly threatening a witness is covered by § 3C1.1). 
 Lastly, counsel examines the reasonableness of the sentence imposed on Little.  
We agree with counsel that the District Court committed no procedural or substantive 
error in sentencing Little to 180 months‟ imprisonment when the Guideline range was 
151 to 188 months.  Furthermore, the District Court meaningfully considered the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in arriving at the 180-month sentence. 
 We conclude that counsel‟s Anders brief is adequate on its face.  We further find 
no non-frivolous arguments in support of Little‟s appeal.  We will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court, and, in a separate order, grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw.  
 
